

F.2d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 1993). The Court “may raise the defense of limitations *sua sponte*.” *Harris v. Hegmann*, 198 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1999).

“The statute of limitations for a suit brought under § 1983 is determined by the general statute of limitations governing personal injuries in the forum state.” *Piotrowski v. City of Houston*, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001). In view of Texas’ two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, plaintiff had two years from the date that his § 1983 claims accrued to file suit. *Id.*; accord *Hatchet v. Nettles*, 201 F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 2000).

Accrual of a § 1983 claim is governed by federal law:

Under federal law, the [limitations] period begins to run ‘the moment the plaintiff becomes aware that he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know that he has been injured.’ A plaintiff’s awareness encompasses two elements: ‘(1) The existence of the injury; and (2) causation, that is, the connection between the injury and the defendant’s actions.’ A plaintiff need not know that she has a legal cause of action; she need know only the facts that would ultimately support a claim. Actual knowledge is not required ‘if the circumstances would lead a reasonable person to investigate further.’

*Piotrowski*, 237 F.3d at 576 (citations omitted). In other words, “[t]he cause of action accrues, so that the statutory period begins to run, when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” *Gonzales v. Wyatt*, 157 F.3d 1016, 1020 (5th Cir. 1998).

In this instance, plaintiff’s claims fall well outside the applicable statutes of limitation. Plaintiff’s complaint establishes that he knew the facts that form the basis for his claims on March 4, 2001, when the alleged unconstitutional search and seizure occurred. However, plaintiff did not file the instant suit until July 2004, more than three years after the search of his motor home. It thus appears that his § 1983 causes of action are time-barred. The Court may therefore summarily dismiss these claims as untimely. See *Gartrell v. Gaylor*, 981 F.2d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that